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RECENT CASE NOTES
considering whether or not there was a decision on the merits. Where there
is a reversal because of this rule, it is had solely upon the grounds that the
record does not show that the judgment was rendered on a good paragraph
of the complaint.8 It is clear that when a court reverses the decision because of such a reason and doesn't consider whether or not there was a
decision on the merits, the result is contra to the statutes. It is submitted
that the cases cited to the proposition that a judgment will not be reversed
if there is a decision on the merits, overrule the line of cases which hold
that if a paragraph of the complaint is wrongfully overruled, it is reversible
error if it doesn't appear from the record that the judgment is based on a
good paragraph; and that the former cases properly give effect to the
statutes.
M. K.
PROCESS--JuDGMnNT-CoNcLUSIvENESS or SmmirF's RETuRN-In a suit
to quiet title to certain real estate, appellee and her husband were defaulted
and judgment was rendered quieting title to said real estate in appellant.
Appellee filed suit to set aside this judgment, and the court ordered a summons be served on appellant. The sheriff's return on the summons stated
that it was served on appellant by leaving a copy at his last and usual place
of residence, 1595 Cleveland Street, Hammond, Indiana. Appellant did not
live at 1595 Cleveland Street, but lived in Gary, Indiana. Appellant was
defaulted, and the first judgment in favor of appellant was set aside.
Appellee filed an answer in that suit, praying that title to said real estate
be quieted in her. The case was tried in appellant's absence and Without
his knowledge. Judgment was rendered in favor of appellee, quieting title
in her. Thereafter appellee conveyed the land to a third party. Appellant
brought a second suit to quiet title against appellee and her remote grantee.
From a judgment in favor of appellee, appellant appealed. Held, the trial
court could not set aside the judgment which quieted title in appellant, he
not having received notice of the pendency of said cause "as in an original
action," as provided in Section 423, Burns, 1926.1
Appellant's second suit to quiet title constituted a collateral attack on
the previous judgment against him, since it was an attempt to avoid or correct that judgment in a proceeding not provided by law for that purpose. 2
In the principal case, the Indiana Appellate Court nevertheless held that the
sheriff's return was not conclusive as to matters which are not presumptively within his personal knowledge: e. g., the usual place of residence of
the person served. The case therefore holds in effect that a sheriff's return is not conclusive against collateral attack as to matters not presumptively within his personal knowledge. The only authority cited for this
holding is State of New Jersey v. Shirk.3 In that case the judgment was
attacked by a cross-action. The court first held that the cross-action constituted a direct attack on the judgment, and then decided that the sheriff's
return was not conclusive as to matters not presumptively within his knowl454, 35 N. E. 711; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Turner (1906), 38 Ind. App. 552, 77
N. B. 58.
'Baltimore By. Co. v. Hunsacker (1903), 33 Ind. App. 27, 70 N. E. 556.
1
Papuschak v. Burich, 185 N. E. 876 (Ind.).
2 Spencer v. Spencer (1903), 31 Ind. App. 321, 67 N. E. 1018.
2 75 Ind. App. 275, 127 N. E. 861.
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edge. This case does not seem to be authority for holding a return not conclusive against collateral kttack.
At common law the invariable rule was that the sheriff's return was
absolutely conclusive as between parties and privies, and the remedy of a
party injured by a false return was against the sheriff on his official bond. 4
This is the English rule today.5
In Indiana a long line of decisions has affirmed the proposition that, in
the absence of fraud or collusion, 6 a sheriff's return is conclusive as against
collateral attack.7 The United States Supreme Court has held that this
rule is due process of law.S A proceeding under the Indiana statute allowing relief from a judgment taken against a party through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect9 is a direct attack, and in such
action a return showing service may be contradicted.1O
In other states, by the overwhelming weight of authority, the sheriff's
return is conclusive against collateral attack.11
What is the policy underlying the English and American decisions holding the return conclusive? The reason stated in most cases is that the
sheriff is a sworn officer, to whom the law gives credit.12 The real reason
might be found in the reluctance of the common law to give an additional
remedy where one already existed. "The existence of one remedy was considered sufficient reason for refusing another. One remedy was available for
a false return-an action against the sheriff. One remedy was enough.
Hence no attack on the truth of the return was permitted."13
The chief argument against precluding inquiry into the truth of the
sheriff's return is that such proceeding is a "violation of the fundamental
doctrine that eveiy man is entitled to his day in court-that is, due process
of law under the United States Constitution."14 This argument has been
answered .by the United States Supreme Court in the Indiana case of
Miedrich v. Lauenstein.15
The better view seems to be that since the sheriff is a sworn and bonded
officer, the court has a right to presume that his return is true. To permit
a judgment entered on such return to be set aside afterwards on mere oral
testimony would open the door to fraud and render judgments far less
secure than the law regards them.16
The doctrine set forth in the principal case was adversely criticized in
' Comyns, Dig. Tit. Retorn G.; Barr v. Sachwell (1728), 2 Strange 813, 93 Eng.
Rep. 865.
5 21 R. C. L. 1321.
'Cavanaugh v. Smith (1882), 84 Ind. 380.
7 Splahn v. Gillespie (1874), 48 Ind. 397; Tyler v. Davis (1905), 37 Ind. App.
557, 75 N. B. 3; Birch v. Franz (1881), 77 Ind. 199.
sMiedrich v. Lauenstein (1913). 232 U. S. 236, 58 L. Ed. 584.
9Burns (1926), See. 423.
12
Nietert v. Trentman (1885), 104 Ind. 390, 4 N. B. 306; Cully V. Shirk, Exr.
(1891), 131 Ind. 76, 30 N. B. 882; Groff v. Warner (1909), 44 Ind. App. 544, 89
N. B. 609.
5 0 C. J. 576 and cases there cited.
Splahn v. Gillespie (1874), 48 Ind. 397.
1
Sunderland, The Sheriff's Return (1922), 16 Col. L. Rev. 281.
" (1916)
9 Va. L. Rev. 451.
(1913) 232 U. S. 236, 58 L. Ed. 584.
18
Lile, On Equity Pleading and Practice, p. 35.
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the Colorado case of DuBois v. Clark.17 The court said, "Whether the officer made personal service or not is said to be within his own knowledge;
but whether the place where the writ was left was in fact the usual place
of abode',of the party . . . was something to be ascertained by inquiry

and therefore not necessarily within his knowledge. But either mode of
service is good, and if the defendant fails to appear, authorizes default
and judgment against him. Why a defendant who is ignorant of the proceedings of the sheriff should be compelled to submit to the hardship of
being concluded by the judgment in one case and not in the other, is, we
confess, not obvious to us."
The court in the principal case evidently assumed that if the return had
showed personal service on appellant it would have been conclusive. Quaere,
why should the identity of defendant be considered presumptively within the
personal knowledge of the sheriff, and the usual place of residence of defendant be not so considered, when the sheriff must rely on inquiry in both
cases?
The opinion in the principal case seems to have little support either in
S. F. S.
reason or authority.
WATERS AND WATER CURSES--NATURAL LAKES AND PONDS-NATURE

RIGHTS-John Sanders, Jr., plaintiff, was owner
of certain real estate, approximately twenty acres of which was covered
with a nonnavigable body of fresh water. Practically all of said lake was
on the land of the plaintiff except a very small portion thereof which extended across plaintiff's east line onto land owned by one Artie D. Fast.
The plaintiff averred that the part of his land so covered by water was very
valuable and profitable as a pleasure and recreation resort for rowing,
fishing and other pastimes, and that he so used and derived profit therefrom. The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, a licensee
of Artie D. Fast, to enjoin the defendant from entering upon land of plaintiff (covered by the lake) and boating and fishing thereon, and anchoring
his boat to the soil covering plaintiff's land over plaintiff's objection. Defendant demurred to this complaint for want of sufficient facts, and the
demurrer was sustained. Held, where there are several riparian owners
on a nonnavigable lake, proprietors and their lessees and licensees may use
surface of whole lake for boating and fishing, if not interfering with the
reasonable use of waters by other riparian owners.1
The precise holding of the above case would seem, from the statement
of the court, to represent a well settled, undisputed statement of the law.
However, a search of the very few authorities on the point involved has
not proved this to be so.
The court, in its opinion, based part of its reasoning on State v. Lowder, 2 the only Indiana case touching, either directly or indirectly, upon the
issue involved. In this case, Lowder and others were prosecuted for having unlawful possession of a seine and for taking fish therewith, in violation of the statute. The Supreme Court, in passing on the correctness of
several instructions given in that case, among which was one that told the
AND EXTENT OF RIPARIAN

1

(1898) 12 Colo. App. 220, 55 Pac. 750.
2 Sanders v. De Rose (1933), 186 N. E. 388.
2 (1926), 198 Ind. 234, 153 N. E. 399, 401.

